Abstract-A system is said to be current-state opaque if the entrance of the system state to a set of secret states remains opaque (uncertain) to an intruder-at least until the system leaves the set of secret states. This notion of opacity has been studied in nondeterministic finite automata settings (where the intruder observes a subset of events, for example, via some natural projection mapping) and has been shown to be useful in characterizing security requirements in many applications (including encryption using pseudorandom generators and coverage properties in sensor networks). One limitation of the majority of existing analysis is that it fails to provide a quantifiable measure of opacity for a given system; instead, it simply provides a binary characterization of the system (being opaque or not opaque). In this paper, we address this limitation by extending current-state opacity formulations to systems that can be modeled as probabilistic finite automata under partial observation. We introduce three notions of opacity, namely: 1) step-based almost current-state opacity; 2) almost current-state opacity; and 3) probabilistic current-state opacity, all of which can be used to provide a measure of a given system's opacity. We also propose verification methods for these probabilistic notions of opacity and characterize their corresponding computational complexities.
system to the intruder [1] . Opacity falls in this category and aims at determining whether a given system's secret behavior (i.e., a subset of the behavior of the system that is considered critical and is usually represented by a predicate) is kept opaque to outsiders [2] , [3] . More specifically, this requires that the intruder (modeled as a passive observer of the system's behavior) never be able to establish the truth of the predicate.
Many earlier works considered opacity with respect to predicates that are state based (e.g., [3] and [4] ). In this setting, one is typically given a discrete event system (DES) that can be modeled as a nondeterministic finite automaton (NFA) under partial observation, captured via a natural projection map on its transitions, and (partially) unknown initial state. The secret behavior of the system may be the behavior that allows an external observer to deduce with certainty that the current state of the system falls within a given set of secret states (current-state opacity) or that the system has originated from an initial state within (initial-state opacity). Other possibilities for state-based notions of opacity also exist (such as -step opacity in [3] ). The set of secret states is known and fixed over the length of the observation, and the intruder is assumed to have full knowledge of the system model and be able to track the observable transitions in the system via a natural projection mapping or via the observation of associated labels. Note that a system is current-state (respectively, initial-state) opaque if for all possible behaviors and all corresponding observations, the intruder can never pinpoint with absolute certainty that the state of the system at the point when the last observation is made (respectively, at initialization) belongs (respectively, belonged) to the set of secret states. A variety of application areas and examples where the notion of current-state (respectively, initial-state) opacity can be used to characterize relevant security requirements, as well as ways to perform verification, can be found in [3] [4] [5] .
Current-state opacity as defined in [3] does not consider the likelihood of violating a current-state opacity requirement; instead, it simply reports whether a given system is opaque or not. This binary outcome (that the system is current-state opaque or not) might be inadequate in cases where different behaviors in the system (which may or may not violate current-state opacity) have an unequal likelihood of occurring. As an example, consider a mobile agent moving on a 2-D grid covered (partially) by a network of sensors (with some cells of the grid covered by possibly more than one sensor [5] ). At any point in time, the intruder can use the information provided by the sensors to obtain the set of possible locations of the agent. In this context, the notion of current-state opacity can be used to characterize all trajectories that the agent can follow without fully exposing that he or she is currently visiting certain strategic (secret) locations (cells [5] for more details.) However, consider the following two diametrically opposite scenarios: 1) the probability that the agent follows a trajectory that exposes its current strategic (secret) location (cell) is and 2) the probability that the agent follows a trajectory that exposes its current strategic (secret) location (cell) is 1-. In both scenarios, the system will be classified as a system that violates current-state opacity (as defined in [3] ) despite the huge discrepancy in the likelihood of observing a sequence of observations that reveals that the system current state belongs to the set of secret states.
Another shortcoming of the definition of current-state opacity in [3] is that it does not attempt to characterize the confidence of the intruder when current-state opacity is not violated (i.e., the probability of the system state belonging to the set ). In the sensor network example from before, assume that a particular sequence of sensor readings reveals, with (at least) 99% (but not absolute) confidence, that the current location (cell) of the agent is a strategic (secret) location for any consistent trajectory (i.e., given the sensor readings, the probability that the current state of the system is within the set of secret states is at least 0.99-but not one). Such a case will not be considered as a violation of current-state opacity (because the intruder is not absolutely certain about the membership of the current state of the system to the set of secret states). These types of situations question the appropriateness of the notion of current-state opacity in applications where the confidence of the intruder can serve as a measure of opacity. Areas where such confidence concerns have been considered include anonymity protocols [6] [7] [8] , where a set of users takes actions that generate associated outputs observed by intruders who then try to guess the identity of the originator of the action. The goal of any anonymity protocol is to hide the origin (user) for certain actions in the system despite the observed outputs. In order to describe the level of protection offered by an anonymity protocol, three notions have been defined in [8] : 1) beyond suspicious: when the sender of a message appears no more likely to be the originator than any other potential sender; 2) probable innocence: when the sender appears no more likely to be the originator of the message than not to be the originator; and 3) possible innocence: when there is a nontrivial probability that the sender is someone else.
A. Contributions
The work in this paper devises appropriate measures to quantify opacity in a probabilistic setting and is motivated by the absence of likelihood information in most of the existing work on current-state opacity. Notable exceptions are the information-theoretic works in [9] , [10] , and, more recently, the work in [11] , which we revisit once we have a chance to describe the contributions in this paper in more detail. We consider a scenario where we are given a stochastic discrete event system (SDES) that can be modeled as a probabilistic finite automaton (PFA) with partial observation on its transitions. Assuming that the initial-state distribution vector is known, we define and analyze the complexity of verifying different notions of opacity as will be described. In the following definitions, we make a distinction between the a priori probability and the conditional (a posteriori) probability of certain behavior of interest: the conditional probability refers to the probability conditioned on a particular sequence of observations (i.e., following behavior in the system that generates this particular sequence of observations) whereas the a priori probability refers to the probability before any sequence of observations is made (i.e., it is the probability over all possible behavior in the system). We consider the following three notions of opacity: 1)
Step-based almost current-state opacity considers the a priori probability of violating current-state opacity following any sequence of events of length , and requires that this probability lies below a threshold for all possible lengths . 2) Almost current-state opacity is the extension of stepbased almost current-state opacity when there is no consideration regarding the length of the sequence of events, that is, it considers the a priori probability of violating current-state opacity following any sequence of events, and requires that this probability lies below a threshold. 3) Probabilistic current-state opacity requires that for each possible sequence of observations, the following property holds: the increase in the conditional probability that the system current state lies in the set of secret states (conditioned on the given sequence of observations) compared to the prior probability (that the initial state lied in the set of secret states before any observation became available) is smaller than a given threshold. We provide methods for verifying step-based almost current-state opacity and almost current-state opacity. We also characterize the complexity of the proposed verification methods and establish that verifying almost current-state opacity is PSPACE-hard. Finally, we establish that probabilistic current-state opacity is an undecidable problem in its general form.
Remark 1:
Step-based almost current-state opacity and almost current-state opacity require that the a priori probability of behavior that violates current-state opacity lies below a threshold. Probabilistic current-state opacity, on the other hand, considers the conditional probability that the system current state lies in the set of secret states (conditioned on a given sequence of observations), and requires that this probability lies below a threshold for all possible behavior in the system. As a result, one can think of step-based almost current-state opacity and almost current-state opacity as notions that quantify current-state opacity, whereas probabilistic current-state opacity quantifies the lack of current-state opacity.
B. Related Work
Apart from the obvious connections to state-based notions of opacity in nondeterministic finite automata as described earlier, the work in this paper is also related to existing security work in stochastic settings. In particular, [12] and [13] focus on systems whose state transition functions are captured by probability distributions and define the advantage of the intruder for a given sequence of observations as the increase in the conditional probability that the system current state resides within the set of secret states (given is observed) compared to the probability before any observation is available, that is,
. The authors of [12] and [13] define three notions of opacity depending on the value of as follows: strict opacity requires (i.e., ) for all possible sequences of observations; cryptographic opacity requires to be negligible for all possible observations (i.e., for some small ); and plausible opacity requires for all possible sequences of observations (i.e., for each sequence of observations, which is equivalent to the notion of current-state opacity in [3] ). The authors of [12] and [13] consider the verification of all three notions using exhaustive computation which is possible because the (stochastic) system they consider is assumed to have finite behavior (i.e., the length of possible state sequences in the system is finite). The notion of probabilistic current-state opacity introduced in this paper essentially extends the notion of cryptographic opacity in [12] and [13] to probabilistic finite automata (with possibly infinite behavior). We show that even for this special class of probabilistic systems, verifying probabilistic current-state opacity is generally an undecidable problem. This implies that verifying cryptographic opacity for stochastic systems with possibly infinite behavior is also undecidable. Note that the notions of step-based almost current-state opacity and almost current-state opacity introduced in this paper are not present in [12] and [13] .
Our work in this paper is closely related to [11] , which studies probabilistic automata with a terminating action, which effectively makes the probabilistic automaton a Markov chain with a single absorbing (sink) state. Among the four notions of opacity considered in [11] , namely, liberal probabilistic (symmetrical) opacity (LPO, LPSO) and restrictive probabilistic (symmetrical) opacity (RPO, RPSO), the most closely related to our work is the notion of LPO: LPO aims at evaluating the a priori probability that the system generates sequences of observations that allow the intruder to determine a violation of opacity. This relates to the notion of almost current-state opacity in our paper with the understanding that a violation of opacity occurs when the intruder can determine that the system is in a secret state. The main difference is that in our work, we consider arbitrary probabilistic automata without a requirement for a terminating condition. Note that the notions of step-based almost current-state opacity and probabilistic current-state opacity are quite different from the measures of opacity used in [11] . Before closing, we point out that despite the similarities between (the deterministic versions of) opacity and diagnosability, the probabilistic notions of opacity introduced in this paper and the notions of -and -diagnosability in [14] are not easily comparable. Leaving probabilistic aspects aside, it is also worth mentioning that [15] studied opacity in timed automata and established that even for the restrictive class of event recording timed automata, the opacity problem is undecidable.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND BACKGROUND

A. Nondeterministic Finite Automata
Let be an alphabet and denote by the set of all finitelength strings of elements of , including the empty string (of length zero). A language is a subset of finite-length strings from . For a string , the prefix-closure of is defined as , where denotes the concatenation of strings and . For any string , denotes the length of , whereas denotes the cardinality of the set [16] .
A nondeterministic finite automaton (NFA) is denoted by where is the set of states and is the set of events. 1 denotes the accessible part of the automaton (i.e., the set of states reachable from the set of initial states via some string ). The construction of the product automaton implies that [16] . In general, only a subset of the events can be observed. Typically, one assumes that can be partitioned into two sets, the set of observable events and the set of unobservable events (so that and ). The natural projection can be used to map any trace executed in the system to the sequence of observations associated with it. This projection is defined recursively as , with if and if [16] . More general projection maps can also be handled by the techniques we propose but we restrict attention to natural projection for notational simplicity.
The set of states that the system might reside in given that a sequence of observations has been observed is referred to as the current-state estimate. The current-state estimator (or observer) is a deterministic finite automaton (DFA) which captures these estimates and can be constructed as follows [16] : 1) Each state of is associated with a unique subset of states of the original NFA (so that there are, at most, states) and 2) the initial state of is the unobservable reach of , that is, the set of states that are reachable from some state in via a sequence of zero, one, or more unobservable transitions. 3) At any state of the estimator , the next state upon observing an event is the unique state of associated with the set of states that can be reached from (one or more of) the states in with a string of events that generates the observation . We denote this automaton by , where is the set of states reachable in from the initial state . Example 2: Consider the NFA in Fig. 1 (a) with initial state . Assuming that , the current-state estimator in Fig. 1 (b) is constructed as follows. Starting from the initial state {0} and observing , the current state is any of the states in {1, 2}; at this new state, the set of possible transitions is the union of all possible transitions for each of the states in {1, 2}. Following this procedure, can be completed as in Fig. 1(b) . Assuming that , the current-state estimator is shown in Fig. 2 and it is constructed in a similar manner.
Current-state opacity assumes a given set of secret states and requires the secret behavior of the system (i.e., the membership of its current state to the set ) to remain opaque (uncertain) until the system enters a state outside the set of secret states . The following is the formal definition of current-state opacity from [3] .
Definition 3 (Current-State Opacity): Given an NFA , a natural projection map with respect to the set of observable events , and a set of secret states , automaton is current-state opaque with respect to and (or current-state opaque), if
One can check whether a system is current-state opaque by constructing the current-state estimator and by verifying that no (nonempty) current-state estimate lies entirely within the set of secret states [3] , [17] [18] [19] . This approach would have complexity exponential in the size of the given system; it is worth pointing out that the verification of current-state opacity has been shown in [18] to be PSPACE complete.
Example 4:
Consider the nondeterministic finite automaton depicted in Fig. 1(a) with . Suppose that and . From the current-state estimator in Fig. 1(b) , we see that the current-state estimate {4} is reachable via sequences of the form and lies entirely within the set of secret states. This violates current-state opacity; thus, NFA is not current-state opaque with respect to and . Note, however, that NFA is current-state opaque with respect to and . Things are a bit different when . For example, still assuming that , we see from the current-state estimator in Fig. 2 that the system is current-state opaque with respect to
and , but not current-state opaque with respect to and (where is the natural projection associated with ).
B. Probabilistic Finite Automaton
A stochastic discrete event system (SDES) is modeled in this paper as a probabilistic finite automaton (PFA)
, where is the set of states;
is the set of events; is the initial-state probability distribution vector; is the state transition probability defined for ; and , as the probability that event occurs and the system transitions to state given that the system is in state [20] , [21] . When 0, state is not reachable from state via event (in the diagram representing the given PFA, we do not draw such transitions). Clearly, we need
An example of a probabilistic finite automaton that satisfies these assumptions can be seen in Fig. 1(c) .
We denote the current-state probability distribution vector after observing the sequence of observations by . For convenience, we index the elements of the column vector starting from 0 so that the th element of , denoted by , , corresponds to the probability that the current state is state . Also, we denote the 1-norm of the vector by , that is, . It can be shown [20] that for (1) where , , is the state transition probability matrix associated with the observable event . Specifically, the th element of matrix denotes the conditional probability that the system transitions to system state and generates the observation given that it is in state . Note that is the number of states of the PFA , and the number of different is equal to . For example, for the PFA in Fig. 1(c) , we have the matrices shown in Fig. 3 .
We assign a probability to each trace in with the interpretation that this value determines the probability of its occurrence. More formally, assuming that denotes the probability that is executed in the system and the current state of the system becomes state , we define for (2) When is partitioned into the set of observable events and the set of unobservable events , we can define the probability of observing a sequence of observations as the probability of occurrence of any string in the system which produces the sequence of observations . Note that if two strings and produce the sequence of observations (i.e.,
) and one is a prefix of the other, say , then to obtain the probability of observing the sequence of observations , we only include the probability of the prefix string .
A finite Markov chain (MC) is denoted by , where is the set of states, is the state transition probability defined for , as the probability that system state transitions to state , and is the initial-state probability distribution vector. We associate with MC a state transition probability matrix such that the th element of matrix is defined as . Using the state transition probability matrix , one can iteratively obtain its current-state probability distribution vector after steps via (so that ). Each PFA can be associated with a unique MC where the Markov chain state transition probability is defined for as [22] . Given a PFA , we can also associate with it a unique NFA [21] where the state transition function is defined for , as and the set of possible initial states is defined as . In this way, the behavior of PFA is mapped to the behavior of the associated NFA , that is, , where is naturally defined as
. Fig. 1(a) depicts the NFA associated with the PFA in Fig. 1(c) . Note that the NFA associated with the PFA is independent of and, in our example, in Fig. 1(c) , it remains the same regardless of whether one deals with or with .
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Notions of Opacity for SDES 1)
Step-Based Almost Current-State Opacity: Based on Definition 3, a given system is not current-state opaque even if the probability of observing a sequence of observations that reveals that the system current state is within the set of secret states is very small. One way to quantify current-state opacity is to obtain the probability of violating current-state opacity at a given point along all sequences of events. Definition 5 below takes this perspective and characterizes the probability of violating current-state opacity assuming that the system has generated events.
Definition 5 ( Step-Based Almost Current-State Opacity): Given a PFA and its associated NFA , a natural projection map with respect to the set of observable events
, and a set of secret states , define and Then, PFA is step-based almost current-state opaque with respect to , , and a threshold (or -almost current-state opaque where the symbol " " is used to indicate step based) if Note that the language in Definition 5 denotes the set of strings in the system that violate current-state opacity, that is, upon observing , the intruder is certain that the current state of the system is within the set of secret states. According to Definition 5, PFA is step-based almost current-state opaque if the occurrence of strings of length that violate current-state opacity has a cumulative probability that is less than . Note that if is current-state opaque, then is -almost current-state opaque for any . Example 6: Consider the PFA depicted in Fig. 1(c) with . Assume that and that (where or denote the transpose of matrix or vector ). We have . Let us verify whether the system is step-based almost current-state opaque with respect to , , and 0.05. There is no string in of length less than 3, so we start with 3. We have . Next, we consider 4. We have 0.05. It is not hard to see in this case that decreases with which implies that the system is step-based almost current-state opaque with respect to , , and 0.05. In Section IV, we provide a systematic way to verify for all for any given PFA using finite memory.
Remark 7:
By considering the number of events in the system and not the number of observations (observable events), stepbased almost current-state opacity captures the a priori probability that current-state opacity will be violated after events, before any events (or corresponding observations) take place. In essence, step-based almost current-state opacity looks at things from the perspective of the user that plans to initiate events in the system and is interested in the probability that the intruder might be able to establish a violation of current-state opacity.
The authors of [23] introduced the notion of -containment for languages to quantify the probability that a supervised system violates its associated legal specification. Language is a -containment of the legal language if the probability that a string in the language will continue to become a string in the language but outside the language is less than . More formally, language is a -containment of the legal language if 0, , where denotes the probability that occurs given that has occurred. Assuming that and , we have: if language is a -containment of the language , then the cumulative probability of all strings whose associated sequences of observations violates current-state opacity is less than . (Note that there is no restriction on the length of strings in this sum.) Therefore, if language is a -containment of the language , then PFA , with associated NFA , is step-based almost current-state opaque with respect to , , and . The reverse is not necessarily true because in Definition 5, we do not require the cumulative probability of all sequences of observations that violate current-state opacity to be less than ; instead, only those that have a fixed length are considered.
2) Almost Current-State Opacity: Another way to quantify current-state opacity is to consider all sequences of events (of arbitrary length) and to obtain their cumulative probability of violating current-state opacity (at any point along them). We refer to this notion as almost current-state opacity. One can think of almost current-state opacity as a way to characterize the security requirements of the system before it starts operation (in terms of the probability of eventually violating opacity-at some point during its operation). . Also, if strings and with such that one is a prefix of the other (e.g., ) violate current-state opacity, only the probability of the occurrence of the shorter string (i.e., string ) needs to be considered in obtaining the probability of violating current-state opacity (because for the execution of string , string needs to be executed first). For this reason, the definition of the language in Definition 8 only includes strings in such that no prefix of is a member of . This implies that none of the strings in are prefixes of each other, that is, . Note that although none of the strings in is a prefix of another, they may share a common prefix. Also, can possibly have infinitely many elements (refer to Example 9 which will be discussed shortly).
The aforementioned discussion implies that only includes strings in the system that violate current-state opacity for the first time, that is, no prefix of these strings violates current-state opacity. As a result, the cumulative probability of strings in is essentially the a priori probability of violating current-state opacity before the system starts operation.
According to Definition 8, PFA is -almost current-state opaque if the probability of violating current-state opacity in the NFA associated with the PFA is below the threshold . Note that if is current-state opaque, then is -almost current-state opaque for any . In Section IV, we describe how almost current-state opacity can be verified. The following example illustrates Definition 8.
Example 9: Consider the PFA depicted in Fig. 1(c) with . Assume that and that , that is, the initial state of the system is state 0 (recall that or denotes the transpose of matrix or vector ). We have . This implies that and, hence Hence, for any , the system is almost current-state opaque with respect to , , and . In Section IV, we provide a systematic way to obtain the probability for any given PFA .
Remark 10: Note that if language is a -containment of the language (see Remark 7 for the definition of -containment), then PFA , with associated NFA , is almost current-state opaque with respect to , , and . The reverse is not necessarily true. This is because in Definition 8, we do not require the cumulative probability of all sequences of observations that violate current-state opacity to be less than ; instead, only those that are not prefixes of each other are considered.
3) Probabilistic Current-State Opacity:
Step-based almost current-state opacity and almost current-state opacity can be used to quantify current-state opacity when the given system is not current-state opaque. For the case when the given system is current-state opaque, one way to further quantify current-state opacity is to determine, for each (possible) sequence of observations generated by the system, the probability that the system current state lies in the set of secret states. This probability captures the confidence of the intruder that the system is in a secret state. We refer to this notion as probabilistic current-state opacity and we formalize it below.
Definition 11 (Probabilistic Current-State Opacity): Given a PFA , a projection map with respect to the set of observable events , and a set of secret states
, PFA is probabilistically current-state opaque with respect to , , and (or )-probabilistically current-state opaque), if (3) where denotes the vector 1-norm and denotes the vector of elements of the initial-state (current-state) probability distribution vector indexed by the elements in the set (see the discussion before and after (1)).
Note that in Definition 11 can be seen as the confidence of the intruder, after observing the sequence of observations that the current state of the system lies in the set of secret states. Similarly, denotes the initial confidence of the intruder, before any observation occurred in the system, that the then state of the system lied in the set of secret states. Therefore, according to Definition 11, PFA is probabilistically current-state opaque if, after the observations, the increase in the confidence of the intruder that the current state of the system lies in the set of secret states is less than the threshold . Note that (3) is also verified for that cannot be possibly generated by the system (i.e., there does not exist , where is the NFA associated with PFA , such that ); this does not matter, however, because in those cases, (3) trivially holds. Also note that if is -probabilistically current-state opaque, for some , then its associated NFA is current-state opaque; however, the converse is not necessarily true. The following example illustrates Definition 11.
Example 12: In this example, we show that the PFA depicted in Fig. 1(c) 
B. Motivational Example
There are many application areas where state-based notions of opacity can be used to characterize the security or other requirements of interest. In our earlier work [4] , we studied conditions under which the seed (or more generally the past state or the current state) of a pseudorandom number generator in a cryptographic protocol can be compromised, and showed that this problem can be formulated and analyzed using the notions of current and initial-state opacity [4] (or, more generally, -step opacity [3] ); similarly, our work in [5] used state-based notions of opacity to address tracking problems in sensor networks. When probabilities are available, this type of problem can be more precisely analyzed using the framework of this paper. In the sequel, we discuss an example in the context of anonymity for web transactions which was initially studied in [8] (also in [11] ) and show how this example can be analyzed using the probabilistic notions of opacity introduced in this paper.
Example 13: "Crowds" is a system which aims to protect anonymity on the worldwide web. Given a set of users , crowds partitions them into geographically diverse groups (crowds)
. Each crowd issues requests to the server on behalf of its members (users) [8] . A user is represented in a crowd by a process called a "jondo." Any request coming from the user's browser is sent directly to the jondo. Upon receiving a request from the browser of user for server , jondo initiates the establishment of a random path of jondos (possibly in more than one crowd) , , , that carries its user's transactions to and from the intended web server . More precisely, when jondo receives the request, it flips a biased coin to determine whether or not to forward the request to another jondo. If the result is to forward, then the jondo selects a random jondo (possibly in a different crowd) and forwards the request to it; otherwise, the jondo submits the request to the end server for which the request was destined. Thus, each request travels from the user's browser, through a number of jondos (in possibly more than one crowd) and, finally, to the end server.
Due to physical limitations, a jondo can only send messages to neighboring jondos (possibly in different crowds). We can model this via an NFA whose nondeterministic state transition functionality captures the randomness in the selection of jondos, and labels are chosen in order to properly capture the type of information revealed when a particular jondo is selected.
The security of Crowds has been studied in [8] by obtaining the probability that the identity of the originating jondo is revealed to a set of collaborating jondos. This calculation is carried, assuming that each jondo can directly send messages to any other jondo in Crowds (in this case, the communication graph is fully connected) and that the probability that a jondo forwards a message to another jondo is the same for all jondos. Moreover, the authors in [8] only analyze the steady-state behavior of the system and, as a result, the performance of the system becomes dependent only on the number of jondos, the number of collaborating jondos, and the probability of forwarding the message. The framework we introduce in this paper can be used to analyze the security properties of Crowds (and similar protocols) in a more systematic fashion; more specifically, general jondo communication graphs are allowed and the probability of forwarding can be different for various jondos. In this way, the notions of opacity that are introduced in this paper can be used to study the transient and steady-state behavior of the system.
IV. VERIFYING STEP-BASED ALMOST CURRENT-STATE OPACITY
In order to verify step-based almost current-state opacity for a given PFA , we need to obtain, for , the cumulative probability of violating current-state opacity for all strings of length . One way to do this is to characterize the set of sequences of observations which violate current-state opacity and then obtain the probability of occurrence, in the system, of strings of length that generate such sequences of observations. The potential problem here is that there are infinitely many , and enumeration of the strings and their probabilities for each might require infinite memory; in this section, we argue how this problem can be avoided.
The sequences of observations that violate current-state opacity are captured in the current-state estimator for the NFA associated with the given PFA by the sequences of observations that reach a state in the current-state estimator whose associated current-state estimate (is nonempty and) lies entirely within the set of secret states. The strings in the system that can generate these sequences of observations can contain, of course, any number of unobservable events between the observable events in these sequences, as long as the resulting string can be generated by the given system. We can systematically characterize such strings as follows: we first add a self-loop (i.e., a transition from a state to itself) to each state of the current-state estimator for each label in the set of unobservable events ; this results in a (deterministic) finite automaton that we denote by . We then form the product of the NFA and this modified current-state estimator. By construction, any string that reaches a state in the product automaton whose associated current-state estimate lies in the set of secret states is a string in the system whose corresponding sequence of observations violates current-state opacity.
The aforementioned state-based characterization of behavior that violates opacity is appealing since it provides a compact way to represent all such strings. However, the aforementioned characterization cannot be used to compute the probability of occurrence of strings in the system that violates current-state opacity, because the product operator that acts on the NFA and the modified current-state estimator does not take into account the probabilities associated with transitions. In order to tackle this, we introduce a product operator similar to the product operator for two NFAs, which acts on a PFA and an NFA such that the probabilities associated with events in the PFA are retained. There is no normalization associated with this operator, and the resulting product automaton is a PFA if and only if none of the strings in the input PFA is disabled by the input NFA. Since the closed behavior of PFA is a sublanguage of the closed behavior of the modified current-state estimator , the product of the PFA and the modified current-state estimator results in a PFA which retains not only the previous state-based characterization of strings in the system that violate current-state opacity, but also the transition probabilities required for computing the probability of occurrence of such strings. In other words, the strings in the system whose corresponding sequences of observations violate current-state opacity are those strings that reach a state in whose associated current-state estimate (is nonempty and) lies within the set of secret states. Thus, the probability of occurrence of such strings (and, hence, the probability of violating current-state opacity) can be obtained as the probability of reaching certain states in . The labels on the transitions can be discarded and we can compute the probability of violating current-state opacity by 1) constructing the MC associated with the PFA and 2) calculating the probability of reaching MC states whose associated current-state estimate lies entirely within the set of secret states. The details of this construction are provided in the algorithm below.
Algorithm A:
Given a PFA and its associated NFA , a natural projection map with respect to the set of observable events , and a set of secret states : 1) Construct the (deterministic) current-state estimator associated with and natural projection map . Note that denotes the initial-state of (and includes the possible initial states of as well as any states in the unobservable reach of ). 2) Construct the DFA from by adding a self-loop to each state of DFA for each label in the set . 3) Construct the PFA where 1) is the set of states . 2) is the state transition probability defined for (i.e., and ), (i.e., and ), and , as , if
, and , otherwise.
3)
is the initial-state probability distribution vector indexed by the states of PFA (i.e., ) with the th element of the vector defined for , as , and , otherwise. 4) Construct the MC associated with the PFA , that is, define the Markov chain with state transition probabilities for as .
Example 14:
Consider the PFA depicted in Fig. 1(c) . We assume that , , and . We follow Algorithm A to construct MC , which can be used for verifying step-based almost current-state opacity. Fig. 1(b) depicts the current-state estimator for the NFA [depicted in Fig. 1(a) ] associated with the PFA . There is no unobservable event in the system and, hence, Step 2) can be skipped . Next, in Step 3) of Algorithm A, we construct the PFA , which is depicted in Fig. 4 . Following the notation in Algorithm A, we have for , , and , otherwise. Following Step 4) of Algorithm A, we construct the MC associated with the PFA as depicted in Fig. 5 . Theorem 15: Given a PFA , a natural projection map with respect to the set of observable events , and a set of secret states , construct the MC as in Algorithm A and denote the state transition probability matrix associated with MC by . Let denote the set of states in MC , whose associated current-state estimate lies within the set of secret states , and let be a binary row vector which is indexed by states in such that each element whose index is in is 1 (otherwise, it is 0). Then, PFA is step-based almost current-state opaque with respect to , , and if and only if for all (4) where . Proof: In [3] and [17] [18] [19] , it is shown that the sequences of observations that violate current-state opacity can be characterized as the strings in the current-state estimator that reach a state whose associated current-state estimate (is nonempty and) lies entirely within the set of secret states. One can find the strings in the system that generate such sequences of observations through inverse projection. For this, one can add a self-loop to each state of the current-state estimator for each label in the set of unobservable events , obtaining in this way the modified current-state estimator [16] . When computing the product of PFA and , it can be easily verified that , which implies that automaton constructed in Step 3) is a PFA; moreover, PFA contains the same strings with the same probability as PFA . In other words, the net effect of the product is merely to separate the strings in PFA according to the current-state estimate generated by their projection. In particular, the strings in PFA that violate current-state opacity are those that reach states in whose second component is in the set . Note that in Step 4) of Algorithm A, the state structure of PFA is not changed and only the labels are discarded. Therefore, the previous state-based characterization of strings that violate current-state opacity holds. Essentially, this construction has thus far characterized the language in Definition 5. In (4), denotes the current-state probability distribution vector of MC after steps. As constructed in Algorithm A, steps in MC correspond to the execution of events in PFA . Therefore, for is the cumulative probability of all strings of length that reach state in PFA such that the current-state estimate upon observing is . Since, for each state we have , the cumulative probability of being in any of the states after steps is . Therefore, denotes the cumulative probability of all strings in PFA of length such that the current-state estimate associated with the sequence of observations violates current-state opacity (i.e., ). In other words, . This completes the proof.
Theorem 15 states that for PFA to be step based, almost current-state opaque, it is necessary and sufficient that (4) holds for all . Verifying this condition appears to require infinite memory. However, in the sequel, we show that there always exists a finite such that (4) holds for all if and only if it holds for ; this also proves that verifying step-based almost current-state opacity is decidable.
Theorem 16: Given an MC , denote the state transition probability matrix associated with MC by . Let denote a row vector of 0's and 1's which is indexed by states in . Then, there exists an integer (that can be calculated based on and ) such that , where . Proof: Due to space limitations, we provide an abbreviated version of the proof. The full version of the proof can be found in [24] .
Assume that is an stochastic matrix and denote the eigenvalues of by . It can be shown that , [22] . Also, 1 is always an eigenvalue of matrix . Assume that has distinct eigenvalues and a single eigenvalue with unit magnitude, namely, . The eigenvalues of can be ordered based on their magnitude such that , . Since has distinct eigenvalues, it can be written as (5) where is a matrix whose columns are eigenvectors of and is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are the eigen- values arranged according to the ordering of the columns of [25] , that is, . Expanding (5), we can write (6) where , , with being a matrix whose elements are all zero except for the element at the th position which is equal to 1. It can be shown that [22] . Moreover by triangle inequality (7) (Note that has to be a positive constant [22] .) If there exists an integer such that , then we are guaranteed that for all . However, if there does not exist such , then we are guaranteed that for some ,
. To see why, note that since , and approach as approaches infinity. Now, if
does not exist such that , then . Therefore, for some . The proof for the general case when may have multiple eigenvalues of unit magnitude and possibly other repeated eigenvalues can be found in [24] .
Example 17: Given PFA , assume that MC and its associated state transition probability matrix (as described in Theorem 16) are given by , , and . It can be easily verified that the eigenvalues associated with are , , , and . All eigenvalues are distinct, so using (6), we have with matrices , , , and as shown in Fig. 6 . From the above equation and (7) 
V. VERIFYING ALMOST CURRENT-STATE OPACITY
A. Test for the Verification of Almost Current-State Opacity
In almost current-state opacity, we are interested in obtaining the probability of observing a sequence of observations that violates current-state opacity at least once during its execution. In order to include this in our computation, we make the states in the MC (obtained in Step 4) of Algorithm A) whose associated current-state estimate lies within the set of secret states, absorbing. 2 In this way, the probability of violating currentstate opacity can be computed as the absorption probability at these absorbing (sink) states. The following algorithm formalizes the previous discussion and provides more details on the construction. Proof: In the proof of Theorem 15, we showed that in Step 4) of Algorithm A, we have characterized the language in Definition 8. In order to characterize the language , we only need to consider strings in for which no prefix is a member of . This implies that for any string in , the continuation of in is not included in . This is achieved by making certain states in MC absorbing, specifically those states whose associated current-state estimate lies within the set of secret states. In this way, the probability of absorption in all such states in the final MC is correctly equal to the cumulative probability of strings in . The system of linear equations introduced in the theorem merely describes the probability of absorption more formally [26] . This completes the proof.
Example 19: Consider the PFA depicted in Fig. 1(c) . We assume that , , and , that is, the initial state of the system is state 0. We follow Algorithm A (as explained in Example 14) and construct the MC associated with the PFA as depicted in Fig. 5 . In order to construct the MC from the MC , we need to make certain states in MC absorbing, specifically those states whose associated current-state estimate lies within the set of secret states. The only state in the finite MC with this property is state (4, {4}). Fig. 7 depicts the MC which is obtained from the MC by making state (4, {4}) absorbing. Using Theorem 18, the probability of absorption in the set can be obtained as where denotes the probability of absorbtion in from state (0, {0}) in MC . This probability can be obtained via the following system of linear equations:
as . Therefore, by Theorem 18, for any , the PFA is almost current-state opaque with respect to , , and . This is consistent with Example 8.
Remark 20:
The complexity of the verification method outlined in this section is, in general, exponential in the size of the given PFA : finding the probabilities of absorption is polynomial in the size of the Markov chain , but the problem is that the construction of relies on the current state estimator whose number of states is potentially exponential in the size of the given PFA.
B. Characterizing the Complexity of the Verification of Almost Current-State Opacity
The verification method for almost current-state opacity using Theorem 18 requires the construction of the current-state estimator which has state-space and time complexity (since all of the probabilistic automata and MCs that are constructed in Algorithm A have state-space complexity). This implies that the verification method introduced in this section for almost current-state opacity has exponential space and time complexity. In the following theorem, we use a result from [18] and [19] that shows that verifying current-state opacity is PSPACE-complete to establish that verifying almost current-state opacity is PSPACE-hard. Given an NFA , we construct a PFA such that verifying current-state opacity for is equivalent to verifying -almost current-state opacity for for some particular value of that we characterize exactly. This implies that every instance of the current-state opacity verification problem (CURRENT) can be reduced to an instance of the almost current-state opacity verification problem (A-CURRENT) with ; therefore, A-CURRENT is PSPACE-hard. Proof: (If) If the PFA is -almost current-state opaque, then the probability of violating current-state opacity in the NFA associated with the PFA is smaller than . Thus, we know that the probability of absorption in the set of states in MC (constructed as in Algorithm A) is less than . However, since MC has, at most, states, the probability of absorption of any reachable state would be at least (because each transition has a probability of at least and a reachable state can be reached via a sequence of transitions that involves, at most, all states in MC [18] , [19] , it follows from the above theorem that the A-CURRENT problem is PSPACE-hard.
VI. VERIFYING PROBABILISTIC CURRENT-STATE OPACITY
In the sequel, we show that the problem of verifying probabilistic current-state opacity (P-CURRENT) is undecidable using a reduction from the emptiness problem (EMPTY) for stochastic automata, which is known to be undecidable [20] , [27] .
Definition 22 (Stochastic Automaton):
A stochastic automaton is represented by , where is the finite set of states, is the finite set of inputs, is a column vector of size whose entries are all zeros except for a single entry with value 1 (corresponding to the initial state), and the transition probabilities for each , satisfy
For , the matrix is defined as the matrix whose th entry is given by (i.e., ) and is a column stochastic matrix. Remark 23: Note that a stochastic automaton is different from a PFA in the sense that it fails to characterize the probability of input at state . Should this probability be time-invariant and nonzero, one could easily set and obtain a corresponding PFA with , , and . In the sequel, our reduction will use . Definition 24 (Emptiness Problem (EMPTY)): Given stochastic automaton , constant , , and row vector of size , whose entries are all zeros except for a single entry with value 1 (corresponding to the final state), determine whether there exists such that for some . Definition 25 (P-CURRENT Problem): Given a PFA , a projection map with respect to the set of observable events , and a set of secret states , is PFA probabilistically current-state opaque with respect to , , and ?
Theorem 26: The P-CURRENT problem is undecidable. Proof: We introduce a polynomial-time algorithm which reduces every instance of the EMPTY problem to an instance of the P-CURRENT problem, and since the EMPTY problem is undecidable, this proves that the P-CURRENT problem is also undecidable. Consider the following instance of the EMPTY problem: we are given a stochastic automaton , where is a column vector of size whose entries are all zeros except for entry that has value 1 (i.e., ), and a row vector of size whose entries are all zeros except for entry that has value 1 (i.e., ). In the sequel, using stochastic automaton , we construct a PFA and show that PFA is probabilistic current-state opaque if and only if there exists, for some , , such that . In this way, we reduce each instance of the EMPTY problem to an instance of the P-CURRENT problem.
We construct PFA as follows: we set , , and , and define for and as where we set . Using Assumption (A2), we have , that is, PFA satisfies Assumption (A1). The transition matrices of PFA satisfy for all (8) Now, define where state is the index of the nonzero entry of the vector and define . In order to avoid trivial cases, assume that (but this assumption can be easily removed by introducing a dummy state if ). The initial state is unique (characterized by the only nonzero entry of the vector ), which implies that (9) (because the initial state is different from the secret state ). Also, denotes the cumulative probability of being in the set of secret states after observing and, since state is the only secret state, it is equal to the probability that system resides in state after observing . Putting all of these together, we have By By where the last equation follows from the fact that are column stochastic matrices and satisfy for any . Now, the EMPTY problem requires deciding whether or, equivalently (10) In the previous discussion, we have . Therefore, deciding (10) is equivalent to deciding whether which is equivalent to deciding whether PFA is probabilistically current-state opaque. This completes the proof.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we define, analyze, and characterize the notions of (step-based) almost current-state opacity and probabilistic current-state opacity, as extensions of the notion of current-state opacity [3] to stochastic systems. The notion of current-state opacity requires that the membership of the current state of a given NFA to a set of secret states remain opaque to intruders (passive observers). We define almost current-state opacity for a given PFA by requiring the a priori probability of violating current-state opacity to be below a threshold. We also define probabilistic current-state opacity by limiting the maximum increase in the conditional probability that the system current state lies in the set of secret states (conditioned on a sequence of observations) compared to the case when no observation is available (prior probability). We introduce novel methods to verify step-based almost current-state opacity and almost current-state opacity, using a combination of a {current}-state estimator and an appropriate Markov chain. We also prove that verifying almost current-state opacity is PSPACE-hard and establish that the verification of probabilistic current-state opacity is an undecidable problem.
One important extension for future work is to develop restrictive conditions under which the verification of probabilistic current-state opacity becomes decidable. One trivial case is when the NFA that is derived from PFA has a finite number of strings that reach a state in the set of secret states from a state in the set of initial states . In this case, one can enumerate all possible sequences of observations and obtain the maximum probability of residing in the set of secret states, hence, verifying probabilistic current-state opacity. We are also interested in developing similar frameworks for other state-based notions of opacity, such as initial-state opacity [4] . Initial-state opacity requires that the membership of the initial state of the system to the set of secret states be kept opaque for the duration of the operation of the system and can potentially be handled in a similar fashion.
